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Abstract Negotiations on the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP) commenced in 2013, 
and soon became the most controversial bilateral trade agreement ever attempted by the European Union (EU). When 
trying to understand the escalating debate over the proposed agreement, most analyses have highlighted opposition to the 
deal, especially from civil society organisations. However, a full understanding of the debate surrounding the TTIP 
requires analysis of supporters’ responses, as these changed in response to strategies used by opponents of the agreement. 
This article uses a novel approach in trade policy scholarship—rhetorical analysis—to focus on the European 
Commission Trade Directorate’s response to contestation over TTIP. Drawing on Albert Hirschman’s (1991) work 
on the ‘rhetoric of reaction’, this article identifies the rhetorical strategies used by EU trade commissioners from 2013 
to 2016. It outlines the evolution of the rhetoric and accompanying changes in process and policy, providing insights on 





The Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP) has become the most controversial 
bilateral trade agreement ever attempted by the European Union (EU). Negotiations began in 2013, 
and supporters, including public officials and private interest groups, emphasised from the beginning 
the agreement’s economic and geostrategic benefits (Dempsey 2015; Hamilton 2014). Their 
argument relied primarily on two premises: that lower tariffs and the removal of non-tariff measures 
bring economic gains, and that standards agreed upon by the two largest markets (the EU and US) 
will quickly become global. Civil society organisations (CSOs) such as Public Citizen, the European 
Consumer Organisation (BEUC), Friends of the Earth, and the Transatlantic Consumer Dialogue 
(TACD) led the opposition to the agreement. They mobilized resources and galvanised public 
opinion to an unprecedented extent, adding to traditional opposition to trade deals coming from 
groups such as labour unions. CSOs argued that the mutual recognition of standards would 
undermine safety regulations and increase the power of multinationals through the Investment-State 
Dispute Settlement (ISDS; a system whereby investors can seek redress for compensation against 
host government violations of the terms of the investment treaty), which opponents said would 
allow corporations to sue governments, causing ‘regulatory chill’ (De Ville and Siles-Brügges 2016).1  
                                                          
1
 Though choosing to focus on the same key issues, and undertaking largely similar actions to further their cause, 
reformists, such as consumer organizations and trade unions, would accept an agreement with significant alterations on 
key issues, while rejectionists, such as StopTTIP! and War on Want, oppose an agreement of any kind. In this article we 
do not differentiate between these two opposition groups for two reasons. First, because the overlap between the groups 
means the distinction did not substantially affect the debate. Second, because the Commission’s rhetoric was largely 
aimed at a third party, the public. 
1 
 
Both opponents and supporters tried to convince the public of their arguments. Existing 
analyses of opponents’ inroads and supporters’ failure to control public debate on the TTIP have 
highlighted the unprecedented engagement by CSOs. Bauer (2016) has argued that CSOs’ influence 
was facilitated by the use of social media, while others (De Ville and Siles-Brügge 2016; Young 2016; 
Lamy 2015) have pointed to the equally unprecedented focus their campaign placed on non-tariff 
barriers. Gheyle (2016) has argued that CSO activism politicised the TTIP, leading to what De Wilde 
(2011, 566) refers to as an ‘increase in the polarisation of opinions, interests and values and the 
extent to which they are publicly advanced towards the process of policy formulation within the 
EU.’  
Using the public TTIP debate as a case study, this article instead focuses on the rhetorical 
strategies of TTIP proponents, asking if supporters’ rhetoric changed as the negotiations progressed 
and opposition intensified and, if so, what the results were of these changes. It specifically focuses on 
the evolving response of the European Commission’s Directorate for Trade, for two reasons. First, 
because the European Commission has important competences in trade policy, changes in this 
Directorate’s rhetoric can potentially have a direct political impact. Second, the Commission was 
largely responsible for making the public case in favour of the TTIP agreement. While national 
governments, business organisations, and a substantial majority of the European Parliament 
supported the TTIP when launched in 2013, some governments and European Parliamentarians got 
cold feet as the opposition campaign intensified in 2014 and 2015 (see Siles-Brügge, 2018). Pundits, 
think tanks, Members of the European Parliament (MEPs), and (unofficially) some Commission 
staff criticized governments for not explaining and defending TTIP (Aline 2015).2 A small number 
of pro-TTIP organisations (for example TABC, AmCham, BusinessEurope) ran sustained 
campaigns online (and to a lesser extent on the ground) in 2014 and 2015, but were overshadowed 
by anti-TTIP social media and public initiatives (Ciofu and Stefanuta 2016; Bauer 2016).3 The 
Transatlantic Business Council (TABC), the most active supportive group on twitter, discontinued 
its advocacy in 2016, in part because ‘no one but the Commission is pushing for it and we are beat 
online.’4   
 In the following analysis, we draw on Albert Hirschman’s (1991) seminal work on the 
‘rhetoric of reaction,’ as well as subsequent reviews and revisions. We propose a rhetorical analysis 
of the Commission’s response to TTIP contestation, since the nature of the debate was rhetorical 
rather than dialectic. Rhetoric is a counterpart to dialectic, as political actors are not ‘trying to 
present arguments that might convince an opponent’ but present ‘arguments to convince a third 
party–the audience’ (Finlayson 2013, 317). In the TTIP case, both opponents and supporters fought 
to bring public opinion to their side. The previous pattern of trade policy as an insider’s game was 
no longer applicable, compelling the Commission to actively defend trade negotiations and trade 
policy in the greater public realm. We chose Hirschman’s framework over other rhetorical analysis 
frameworks (e.g. Schimmelfennig, 2001) because of its focus on reaction; it deals not only with 
strategies that can be used to challenge a reform or policy change by opponents, but also with 
responsive strategies supporters can rely on in challenging opponents. It is a framework intended to 
capture the evolution (and all sides) of debate.   
                                                          
2
 Interviews with Commission advisers and business representatives in Brussels and Berlin, April and May 2016, 
indicated that the Commission was surprised and disappointed by the lack of support it received from Member States. 
3 Tweets that include hashtag words generally favourable to the agreement only made up roughly 1% of total tweets, 
whereas tweets advocating a clear no (through hashtags like #stopttip, #nottip, #noalttip and others) represented 99% 
of total TTIP related activity (Coifu and Stefano 2016). YouTube was similarly dominated by opponents (Eliasson and 
Garcia-Duran forthcoming). 
4 TABC representative, Brussels, March 2017.  
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This article neither assesses the quality or content of arguments made (Garcia-Duran and 
Eliasson 2017), nor does it analyse the strengths and limits of rhetorical political analysis (Finlayson 
2007), the role of the Commission in trade negotiations (Poletti and DeBièvre 2013), or the degree 
and causes of TTIP politicisation (Gheyle 2016). Its sole focus lies on the European Commission’s 
response to mounting TTIP opposition between summer 2013 and November 2016, when both 
sides ‘froze’ negotiations (Borderlex 2016). We focus on rhetoric and its effects. Grube (2016, 534) 
states that ‘rhetoric is at one and the same time constitutive and formative of the ideas that are 
expressed through these words’. Political actors therefore lock in a certain path and struggle to 
change their rhetoric without losing legitimacy (‘rhetorical path dependency’). Schimmelfenning 
(2001) likewise argues that ‘rhetorical commitment’ can lead to ‘rhetorical entrapment’. We show 
that TTIP contestation led to changes in the Commission’s rhetoric on EU trade policy. It became 
more conciliatory and functional on certain issues (e.g. transparency), and policy areas (e.g. investor-
state dispute settlement), and more intransigent on others (e.g. trade’s economic benefits), with 
changes occurring to both process (e.g. transparency) and policy (e.g. investor dispute settlement).  
 
The next section discusses theory and methodology. The third and fourth sections look to the 
rhetoric used by the Commission from December 2012 to July 2016. The article concludes with a 
fifth section analysing our findings. 
 
  
Analysing rhetorical strategy  
 
According to Hirschman (1991) there are three principal reactionary theses to a proposed change or 
reform, each leading to different public debates.5 The ‘perversity thesis’ holds that the proposed 
change would only ‘serve to exacerbate the condition one wishes to remedy…’ (p.7) due to 
imperfect foresight. For example, opponents could estimate and reference China’s future economic 
power in arguing that TTIP will bring economic and geopolitical costs, rather than the benefits 
claimed by supporters. The ‘futility thesis’ holds that attempts at social transformation would fail 
because basic societal structures are unchangeable. In the case of TTIP, opponents could argue that 
TTIP is unnecessary because trade and investment flows between the US and the EU are already 
well developed and that they prefer continuing the status quo. Finally, the ‘jeopardy thesis’ argues 
that ‘the cost of the proposed change or reform is too high because it endangers some previous, 
precious accomplishment’ (p. 7); while the proposed modification may be desirable in itself, it 
involves unacceptable costs (p. 81). While the first two theses are based on challenging the benefits 
proclaimed by the supporters, the third admits the possibility of a different perspective: one based 
on the costs of losing (the benefits of) the status quo and ‘the dangers of action’ (p.152). The 
message is simple: ‘We lose and we gain, but what we lose is more precious than what we gain.’ (p. 
123).   
In the TTIP debate, opponents have argued that the agreement would unravel high EU 
standards and governments’ abilities to legislate and regulate health, safety, and welfare provisions in 
the public interest. To convince the public that TTIP would harm product safety and limit the 
                                                          
5 Although the three theses are contradictory Hirschman‘s theory expressly accommodates the likelihood that their 
arguments can be used in the course of the same debate, sometimes even by the same person or group. Shorten (2015) 
has argued that Hirschman’s conception of rhetoric has two limitations: first, the subject matter of rhetoric is conceived 
as an ex post facto rationalisation, and second, it focuses on logos. In other words, Hirschman’s taxonomy assumes that 
supporters and opponents each have a strategy (an interest prior to the articulation of the discourse) and then try to 
imprint their arguments with (quasi-) logic.  
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influence of public policies, opponents deliberately and strategically emphasised controversial issues 
related to food (e.g. hormone treated beef) and Investor-to-State Dispute Settlement systems 
(ISDS), ‘scaring’ citizens through associations and hypotheticals (Bauer 2016; Eliasson and Garcia-
Duran, 2018). Overall, TTIP was framed by opponents as a trade-off between neo-liberalism (or 
‘wild-west capitalism’) and ‘popular sovereignty’ (for example Friends of the Earth Europe 2015).6 
In so doing, opponents developed a ‘jeopardy thesis’ in which the TTIP would erode hard won 
exigent regulatory standards and public policies in Europe. Thus, supporters encountered rhetoric 
focused on the “costs” of losing precious European achievements: high regulatory standards and the 
welfare state. 
 Hirschman (1991, 168-9) argues that when faced with a ‘jeopardy thesis’ supporters may 
appeal to two types of rhetoric: ‘intransigence’ or ‘democracy friendly.’  The latter is so-called 
because it entails deliberation and the modification of initially held opinions. ‘Intransigence’ includes 
two possible forms of rhetoric, ‘mutual support’ and ‘dangers of inaction’ (p.150-151). ‘Mutual 
support’ involves positive messages, putting forward reasons why TTIP will not jeopardise what has 
been achieved. ‘Dangers of inaction’ implies negative messages, emphasising the harm that will come 
from inaction—i.e., a lack of TTIP (p.152). Hirschman considers both reactions intransigent because 
they present benefits and dangers as entirely certain and inescapable. Conversely, ‘democracy 
friendly’ rhetoric represents a more ‘mature’ approach where uncertainty is recognised and the risks 
of both action and inaction are ‘canvassed, assessed, and guarded against to the extent possible’ 
(p.153).  
 Building on Hirschman, Brink (2009) suggests that supporters have a third rhetorical option, 
a ‘functional’ approach. Here, supporters take note of the predominant opposing rhetoric and 
embed their argument within that discourse. They thereby protect their position from any attack that 
may stem from the three topoi of perversity, futility or jeopardy (Brink 2009, 117). Such a scenario 
does not involve supporters’ willingness to change their negotiating position and therefore differs 
from a ‘democracy friendly’ strategy. A functional rhetoric approach would defend TTIP by using 
opponents’ language and standpoints. Given that TTIP opponents have erected themselves as the 
protectors of European values (high standards) and democracy (public policies), a functional strategy 
would accept that values and democracy are at the forefront of EU trade policy, and link these goals 
to ‘mutual support’ and ‘danger of inaction’ scenarios.  
 To analyse the Commission’s evolving rhetoric on TTIP, we have undertaken a qualitative 
content analysis of speeches made by Trade Commissioners on TTIP since the launching of the 
Transatlantic Business Council in December 2012. Qualitative content analysis is not a contradiction 
in terms; it is a research method that ‘tries to synthesize openness – as claimed by the qualitative 
research paradigm – and theory-guided investigation - usually demanded by the hypothetical 
deductive paradigm’ (Kohlbacher 2006, point 5.2.1). Contrary to discourse analysis, such a method 
identifies key discursive elements through a deductive rather than inductive procedure. Yet, it 
diverges from quantitative content analysis by adopting an interpretative focus on discourse changes 
and framings. In the words of Zhang and Wildemuth (2005, 1), ‘qualitative content analysis goes 
beyond merely counting words or extracting objective content from texts to examine meanings, 
themes and patterns that may be manifest or latent in a particular text.’  
We focus on the EU Trade Commissioner; they oversee all trade negotiations, and are the 
official representative and spokesperson on EU trade. Commissioner Karl De Gucht gave ten 
                                                          
6 See for example AFL-CIO, ‘U.S.-EU Free Trade Agreement (TTIP)’,  http://www.aflcio.org/Issues/Trade/U.S.-EU-
Free-Trade-Agreement-TTIP, (accessed 2 January 2016) and German IG Metal ‘Freihandelsabkommen sofort stoppen’ 
http://www.fr-online.de/wirtschaft/freihandelsabkommen-eu-usa--freihandelsabkommen-sofort-stoppen-
,1472780,26460308.html (accessed 3 March 2016) 
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speeches on TTIP in 2013 and eight in 2014, before stepping down; his successor Cecilia 
Malmström gave two speeches in November and December 2014, 20 in 2015 and 13 from January 
to July 2016.  We analyse 27 speeches, including over 50% of speeches in each year 2013-2015, and 
the first half of 2016. We do not discriminate between speeches on grounds of the audience because 
the objective is to establish whether the Commissioners’ rhetoric strategy changed rather than 
whether the discourse catered to particular audiences. As summarised in table 1, the qualitative 
content analysis of these speeches distinguishes between positive (‘mutual support’), negative 
(‘dangers of inaction’), conciliatory (‘democracy friendly’), and functional (adopting opponents’ 
language but not their position) messages. As we show below, while the Commission has 
consistently been conciliatory regarding ISDS, its rhetoric on other issues of contention (economic 
and geopolitical benefits and EU standards) has become increasingly functional and intransigent.  
 
 
Table 1. Commission’s possible responses to opponents’ jeopardy thesis 
 
Possible responses to opponents’ jeopardy rhetoric Meaning 
Positive messaging TTIP will improve the status quo 
Negative messaging The status quo is in danger without TTIP 
Conciliatory messaging TTIP costs should be considered 
Functional messaging 
European values and democracy are more important 
than material or geopolitical benefits 
 
Source: Own elaboration based on Hirschman (1991) and Brink (2009) 
 
To make this article easier to follow, we divided the subsequent content analysis into two sections, 
one per Commissioner. De Gucht’s term in office covered a shorter and less hotly contested period 
of the negotiations than did Malmström’s (still in office as of April 2018), resulting in fewer speeches 
by De Gucht, and thus fewer speeches included in our analysis. However, while personalities matter, 
the Trade Commissioner represents the entire European Commission, so when showing the 
evolution of the rhetoric used by the Commissioner it is appropriate to include all the speeches 
addressing TTIP during the period in question. When citing or referencing a speech by either 
Commissioner we reference the date of the speech. We also organize our findings around the four 
key issues of contention: the economic and geopolitical benefits claimed by TTIP supporters and the 
lower standards and ISDS problems put forward by the opponents (Siles-Brügge, 2018). By doing 
so, we realised two things: First, functional messages are more difficult to identify than positive, 
negative or conciliatory ones. They tend to be general in character and actors can apply them to all 
possible issues of contention. Consequently, some of Malmström’s functional messages are not 
allocated to any specific issue. Second, we added transparency as an issue of contention, since TTIP 
opponents frequently raised the demand for more transparency from negotiators. While such 
demands cannot be considered an argument solely against TTIP, they were nevertheless relevant as 
they targeted the EU’s trade policy procedures.  
 
 




Under Karel De Gucht, the number of arguments used to back TTIP were progressively enlarged, 





The first argument put forward was that TTIP would bring economic benefits, and both positive 
and negative rhetoric was used to this effect in 2012. In a speech on 5 December 2012, De Gucht 
claimed that TTIP would provide economic growth, because any agreement between the US and the 
EU would create an economic multiplier effect (due to the size of the partners’ commercial 
relationship), further integration (the high level of integration between the two partners’ economies 
mean better integrated value chains), and improved confidence (companies could better plan for the 
future). De Gucht also argued that the costs of inaction would be high and that there was no stable 
and beneficial status quo as both partners (the US and EU) were simultaneously negotiating and 
signing other bilateral trade agreements . However, the negative messaging soon dissipated as the 
Commissioner concentrated on the positive reasons for TTIP. Moreover, in 2013, a large study 
quantified the economic benefits of TTIP (2 March 2013, referencing Francois, 2013) and the 
geographic reach expanded, with De Gucht stating TTIP’s clear impact on third countries: ‘The 
economic benefits of this agreement will not be confined to the transatlantic area. This is because 
much of what we plan to do will not discriminate against any of our other trading partners, 
developing or developed.’ (21 May 2013, 4).  
  
 
In 2014, the emphasis continued to be on positive messaging, adding specific examples, as well as a 
new insistence on how small and medium enterprises, who currently “find it much harder to get 
over barriers to trade” (22 May 2014, 3), would benefit from TTIP. Furthermore, as protests by civil 
society organisations intensified, TTIP was said to also ‘give consumers better access to a wider 
range of high quality goods and services at better prices. That means they'll get more choice for their 





Geostrategic issues were at first used by De Gucht to explain TTIP’s positive consequences for the 
wider multilateral trading system. ‘An EU-US partnership can act as a policy laboratory for the new 
trade rules we need …’ because ‘its [WTO] negotiating agenda is blocked, largely because of 
differences of view between developed powers like the US and the rising stars.’ (2 March 2013, 3-4.) 
Thus, ‘through these negotiations we will in fact seek to strengthen the World Trade Organisation 
and the multilateral trading system it oversees.’ (19 April 2013, 2). A few months later, by October 
2013, De Gucht began to emphasise TTIP’s geostrategic importance to counteract fears regarding 
standards, ‘TTIP can support international cooperation on regulatory issues … we should seek to 
exercise joint leadership on these issues. If we do not, others will.’ (negative message) (10 October 
2013, 6-7). From then on, speeches began highlighting the idea that TTIP would allow the EU to 
preserve its ability to set global standards and by do doing improve upon the status quo (positive 
message). At his 22 May 2014 speech in Berlin, tellingly titled “EU Trade Policy as a Means to 
Influence Globalization,” De Gucht explained that ‘If we want to continue to shape the norms, 
rules, standards and disciplines that are so important in a globalized economy, we have to realise that 
6 
 
we cannot do this without partners.’ (22 May 2014, 4). He later added that ‘TTIP is about securing 
our values in a changing world.’ (3 July 2014, 4). In April 2014, De Gucht added an additional issue 
framed as a positive message, this being TTIP’s ability to address ‘the geopolitical challenge posed 
by Europe’s dependence on Russian gas exports.’ (10 April 2014, 3). De Gucht further emphasised 





De Gucht also used positive messaging to negate opponents’ claims regarding the lowering of EU 
standards.7 In 2013, De Gucht explained how regulatory convergence would not lead to a race to the 
bottom, but instead set higher standards. On 10 October 2013, De Gucht argued that the Single 
European Market is ‘the world’s most advanced, most revolutionary, experiment in regulatory 
cooperation.’ (10 October 2013, 3) and it shows that ‘There doesn’t need to be a trade-off between 
high standards and open markets.’ (10 October 2013, 4) He also explained how ‘nothing we will 
agree [on] under this agreement will lower standards of protection.’ (10 October 2013, 6) He argued 
that TTIP, just as the Single Market, will be based on ‘principles of openness and transparency.’ (10 
October 2013, 4). By 2014 the rhetoric became less pedagogic and more pragmatic (even 
conciliatory), highlighting how the EU would prevent any lowering of standards thanks to the 
inclusion of ‘clear statements that both sides retain the right to regulate.’ (10 April 2014, 3). 
Nevertheless, in Berlin, on 3 July 2014, De Gucht accused the President of the Academy of the Arts, 
Klaus Staeck, of fearmongering (he had said on German Television that he did not trust the 
Commission staff), asking the public ‘Why frighten people when the facts speak for themselves?’ (3 
July 2014, 4). He also described declarations that education would suffer because of TTIP as 
‘absurd’ (3 July 2014, 4).8 
 
 
Investor-to-State Dispute Settlement 
 
The issue of ISDS only began appearing in De Gucht’s speeches in early 2014, alongside demands 
of transparency and openness. Opponents linked transparency to ISDS because ISDS is based on 
secret arbitration, but transparency was also linked to all other areas of the negotiations (see Garcia-
Duran and Eliasson, 2017; Gheyle and De Ville, 2017). De Gucht approached it in a conciliatory 
fashion after several CSOs had organised protests and petitions in 2013 and 2014 (see Siles-Brügge, 
2018). In April 2014, De Gucht explicitly referred to the ISDS debate raging in the EU and the 
Commission’s recently launched public consultation, with the goal ‘to create a new, improved type 
of investment agreement.’ (10 April 2014, 4). In May 2014, while clearly supporting the need for 
investment protection in TTIP, the Commissioner declared ‘that there is room for debate, 
interpretation or improvement…’ (10 April 2014, 2) while emphasising that ‘it is our chance to set a 





                                                          
7
 On the latter see for example DeVille and Siles-Brügges 2016. 
8
 De Gucht specifically referred to declarations by Mr. Beckmann from the German teacher’s association on how 
‘German teachers could be replaced by American Apps’ with TTIP (3 July 204, 4). 
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On 6 June 2014, De Gucht expressed surprise at accusations that TTIP negotiations were 
undemocratic and opaque, pointing out that ‘the European Commission publishes its negotiation 
positions, consults with stakeholders, and seeks counsel of the European Parliament, all with the 
strong support of the EU governments in the Council,’ and that ‘no deal can pass without the 
approval of both these bodies.’ (6 June 2014, 2).  
  
Before leaving office, De Gucht used conciliatory rhetoric, emphasising all the ways in which the 
European Commission had become more transparent by engaging with constituents on trade. 
 
We have an open door policy to anyone who is interested in the negotiations – whether from business, NGOs 
trade unions or consumer organisations. We also have structured dialogues with these different groups. …we 
have organised, jointly with the US, dedicated, day-long stakeholder consultation sessions during each 
negotiating round … a standing advisory group of experts, carefully balanced to represent a broad range of 
interests including labour rights, the environment, health, consumer rights and business. (7 October 2014, 4) 
 
 
The Commission’s rhetoric under Malmström 
 
Under Cecilia Malmström the DG Trade communication assumed an increasingly functional 
approach. We consider it functional rather than conciliatory for two reasons. First, because TTIP is 
now framed by the Commission as serving civil society (using the language and standpoints of 
opponents). Second, Malmström’s defence of TTIP nevertheless reinforced De Gucht’s positive 
messaging and added negative messaging on the issues of contention. As shown below, while the 
Commission was prepared to accept TTIP as special, and indicated that changes to ISDS and 
transparency were necessary, it was also adamant in defending TTIP’s benefits, rejecting opponents’ 
arguments regarding the lowering of standards and the need to exclude investor protection.     
 De Gucht’s successor made civil society demands, specifically consumers’ needs, a main 
priority. Two weeks after becoming Trade Commissioner, Malmström stated at a conference at the 
European Parliament that ‘the only valid measure of the success of this negotiation will be whether 
it improves people’s lives’ (18 November 2014, 1). TTIP can do so by addressing ‘the full range of 
consumers’ needs,’ she added (18 November 2014, 3); that is, by promoting growth and jobs as well 
as better government and a stronger voice in the world. One month later, she recognised there was a 
need for ‘all sides [to] engage in real, honest debate …’ and made a concession: ‘So let me start by 
accepting one important point often made against TTIP. This is not just another trade negotiation. 
And we should not present it to people that way’ (11 December 2014, 1). She also presented herself 
and the Commission at the service of the people:  
 
I am listening … this agreement needs to be negotiated openly and transparently … we will open up the ways 
documents are shared with the European Parliament to make it easier for them to hold us to account … we 
negotiate in the interest of our people and we negotiate openly and honestly. (11 December  2014, 1-3) 
  
Trade for All, the Commission’s 2015 trade policy strategy, represents the pinnacle of her functional 
efforts 
 
we have learned from the TTIP debate. On the one hand, we have learned that people do want more trade. 
They see how it can benefit our society. But on the other hand, we have learned that they don’t want to 
compromise on the core principles of European society in order to get those benefits. …they have helped 
shape our approach [and] our new overall EU trade strategy. … In our new approach, trade is not just about 




A subtle change in discourse accompanied the release of Trade for All. While the Commission’s 
communication continued aiming at making consumers, and civil society in general, feel included,9 
the Commission began signalling that trade policy had already adapted to Europeans’ demands. By 
19 October 2015, Malmström stated that in the Commission’s new trade strategy ‘We have taken a 
clear pledge: No trade agreements will ever lower levels of consumer, environmental or social and 
labour protection; Any change to levels of protection can only be upward; And we will never give up 
our right to make policy in the public interest.’(19 October 2015, 6). On 25 April 2016, she added 
that ‘trade agreements need to be about more than economics ...’ (25 April 2016, 4), not only 
because of the TTIP debate, but also ‘because it is written in the EU’s Lisbon Treaty. The European 
Union’s trade policy is part and parcel of its wider foreign policy and must support broader 
objectives.’ (25 April 2016, 5).  
 
 
Economic and geostrategic benefits 
 
While De Gucht distinguished between the economic and geostrategic benefits of TTIP, 
Malmström saw them as linked; she also increasingly emphasized sovereignty and competitiveness in 
order to present TTIP as a positive development. On 30 January 2015, she tied geostrategic benefits 
to the sovereignty question: ‘[TTIP] is not about surrendering sovereignty but about strengthening 
Europe’s position in the world at a time of great change.’ (30 January 2015, 2) In Riga, on 1 June, 
they were linked to global value chains and therefore to economic benefits, ‘TTIP will benefit 
Europeans by giving us a stronger voice in the world … at a time when the world is becoming more 
important in our lives [because] the world economy is becoming more integrated.’ (1 June 2015, 3) 
This positive framing complemented new negative messaging: geostrategic benefits (and indirectly 
economic benefits) depended on the correct ‘timing’, and maintaining the status quo was impossible 
(1 June 2015; 3 June 2015; 11 June 2015). On 22 June 2015, Malmström stressed how it was  
 
vital that we seize this opportunity now. The fact is that the size of the US and EU economies relative to the 
rest of the world is shrinking. … We need to be ready to try new things … . As Tancredi Falconieri says in … 
‘Il Gatopard’: ‘If we want things to stay as they are, things will have to change.’ (22 June 2015, 6).  
 
In September 2015, the Commission also stressed that TTIP was not a substitute for, but rather a 
complement to multilateralism. In doing so, it rejuvenated an argument first made by De Gucht in 
2013, but since excluded from the Commission’s rhetoric. Using multilateralism as a source of 
positive messaging, Malström stated, ‘we need to keep multilateralism in mind when we negotiate 
our bilateral and regional free trade agreements … through the bilateral we are preparing the ground 
for future multilateral work.’ (25 September 2015, 2). Her post-Nairobi speech in January 2016 
optimistically affirmed ‘that WTO is alive and able to make decisions.’ (25 January 2016, 1). On 25 
February 2016, Malmström linked economic benefits with efforts both at the multilateral and 
bilateral level (25 February 2016, 5), explaining that one of the arenas of mutual US and EU support 
is the WTO, revitalised after Bali and Nairobi (10 March 2016, 2). Three months later, she insisted 
that ‘bilateral and regional deals like TTIP can support the multilateral system by acting as policy 
laboratories of sorts.’ (2 May 2016, 3).  
 The Commission also consistently stressed that TTIP is (a key) strategic part of a broader 
EU bilateral trade policy, a strategy to re-energise the European economy. That strategy involves 
                                                          
9 2016 started with speeches with rather telling titles: “TTIP: What consumers have to gain” (26 January 2016) and 
“TTIP and EU Trade: Listening, learning and changing” (22 February 2016) 
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‘working for progress at the WTO. It also involves a comprehensive set of negotiations for bilateral 
free trade agreements on all continents.’ (1 June 2015, 2). On 7 July 2015 Malmström clarified that 
‘TTIP is an essential part of the Commission’s strategy to open markets around the world’ (7 July 
2015, 1). Later she explained that, 
 
TTIP is in fact just a part – the biggest part but a part nonetheless – of our wider efforts on trade. We are using 
a full range of trade policy tools to boost our economy and help us adapt to a changing world. We are working 
on more than 20 agreements with more than 60 countries across the Americas, Asia and Africa. (25 September 
2015, 1) 
 
Following publication of the Trade for All strategy in October 2015, Malmström linked TTIP directly 
to the EU’s global trade strategy. On 17 November 2015 she argued that TTIP was ‘only one part of 
our broader strategy. … our goal is not just to make it easier to connect to the US, which is our 
closest partner, but to make Europe a platform for engaging the whole word’ (17 November 2015, 
3). On 25 February 2016, she defended that ‘we need an active and ambitious international trade 
policy …’ because ‘the question is not “Do you trade with Asia, Europe or America?” but, “Are you 
integrated in these value chains or aren’t you?” ... countries are queuing up to negotiate with us.’ (25 
February 2016, 3-5). On 15 March 2016, Malmström explained how ‘the TTIP negotiations only 
make sense in this broader context. The aim is an EU economy that is open for business with the 
world, not just with the US … TTIP is part of the solution but it’s also part of the wider picture 
too.’ (15 March 2016, 4 and 7). This wider picture is where ‘the objectives of the EU’s trade policy 





Upon entering office, Malmström began explaining with more precision what regulatory 
convergence would imply. On 18 November 2014 she stated that the Commission has to ‘focus our 
work on those areas where EU and US regulations follow similar standards. … we must not change 
our laws in areas where they are just too different … we must not restrict our ability to regulate on 
future issues when we need to’ (18 November 2014, 2-3). That explanation became habitual in her 
speeches. On 19 March 2015, Malmström offered another reason not to be afraid of regulatory 
convergence—the EU’s experience in this area through not only  the European Single Market and 
the World Trade Organization (WTO), but also through bilateral agreements (for example with 
South Korea or Canada). On 27 March she proudly reminded the public that ‘Last week 
Ambassador Froman, my US counterpart, and I released a joint statement making exactly these 
points [nothing in TTIP will affect how national governments choose to deliver public services].’ (27 
March 2015, 4)  
Despite this conciliatory approach, the Commission also proved resourceful in adding new 
positive messages to counteract opponents’ arguments. In February 2015, for example, Malmström 
explained there are several reasons TTIP can help deliver ‘more effective government.’ (5 February 
20015, 2). She said,  
 
the EU and the US have some of the most qualified regulatory experts in the world … when regulators 
cooperate they make better regulation … when authorities cooperate they can enforce the rules better. … [and] 
governments would be able to buy cheaper goods and services “saving taxpayers money” … [and] that means 
more money in the public purse to pay for public services like health and education and strong enforcement of 




On 19 October 2015, Malmström's positive framing became more aggressive. Besides insisting that 
‘in most areas American and European regulations are very similar …’ and that ‘without a doubt we 
have much more in common with the US than we do with many other partners’, she noted for the 
first time that ‘in some cases US rules are even stronger.’ (19 October 2015, 4). On 12 January 2016, 
she was more direct, saying that ‘in some cases US rules are even stronger than ours. That’s what last 
year’s revelations about Volkswagen showed us.’ (12 January 2016, 3). In the other cases (where US 
rules or standards are lower), TTIP can help ensure higher standards, Malmström added. On 25 
April 2016, she claimed ‘The EU also hopes TTIP can help increase the uptake in the US of 
international standards … encourage US standards development organisations and users of 
standards to view [ISO and IEC standards] more positively.’ (25 April 2016, 4).  
 
 
Investor-to-State Dispute Settlement  
 
In January 2015, Malmström recognised that existing language in treaties with ISDS favoured 
investors, thus 
 
the traditional approach to investment protection agreements is too narrow. When people were drafting these 
agreements they were more focused on protecting investment than they were on making sure that governments 
could regulate in the public interest. That imbalance between investor rights and government led to some of 
the cases that shocked people so much. I don’t want an ISDS like that. (30 January 2015, 5).  
 
In February, she added ‘If people are taking the time to listen and learn then we owe them the truth, 
not a new batch of euromyths.’(16 February 2015, 5). On 22 April she acknowledged that ‘the 
Commission also believes that the existing investment agreements are old fashioned and need to be 
updated.’ (22 April 2015, 3) and that TTIP involved risks, ‘there are benefits to be had from freeing 
up trade with the United States. And second that there are risks to be avoided as we do that.’ (22 
April 2015, 1). Nevertheless, the Commission framed the need to include investor protection and 
dispute settlement in TTIP predominantly through intransigent rhetoric, in this case predominantly 
positive messaging. After recognising that CSOs had legitimate worries about the issue (in a speech 
on 30 January 2015), she progressively built an argument based on the idea that TTIP constituted an 
opportunity to modernise investment protection because international investment policy had 
become EU competency. She summarised the argument in a speech to the International Trade 
Committee of the European Parliament on 18 March 2015 that focused on this topic, 
 
the Commission shares most of the concerns that have been raised. Since we got the competence for 
investment our view has been clear: the current network of agreements in place is not fit-for-purpose in the 21st 
century … . And that is why we started to reform ISDS already in the Canadian agreement, CETA. … the 
question about putting investment in TTIP is not whether we should do it but how we can do it right … we 
should aim for a court that goes beyond TTIP. (18 March 2015,1-3).  
 
On 22 June 2015, she presented TTIP as a way to move towards an international investment court 
system (ICS); a way to create ‘a model for the rest of the world to follow.’ (22 June 2015, 5). In 
response to CSO criticism that ICS was little changed vis-à-vis ISDS. On 17 November 2015, she 
emphasised how the EU’s proposal on ICS in TTIP ‘opens the way toward our medium term goal: 
an international investment court.’ (17 November 2015, 3). Despite continued civil society 
opposition (‘ICS was ISDS by another name’) and increased public scepticism among Member State 
governments (especially France and Germany) the Commission persisted, attempting to strike a 
balance between government’s rights to regulate and investor protection. In January 2016, 
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Malmström asserted that ‘we have decided to take the lead on the global effort to reform and 
modernize the overall [investment protection] system.’ (12 January 2016, 4). Negative rhetoric is 
found in just one speech. On 22 April 2015, she stated that some form of arbitration was necessary 
in TTIP to ‘make sure that European companies don’t find themselves at a disadvantage in the US 





By June 2015, Malmström had begun enumerating the efforts she was making to listen and respond 
to people’s concerns.  On 1 June 2015, she explained practical steps. ‘We’re meeting with anyone 
who has an interest in these talks to explain them—consumer groups, trade unions, environmental 
organizations and other interested parties … . And I am personally talking to as many parliaments as 
possible.’ (1 June 2015, 4). On the 22nd of that month, she declared that ‘I have worked to put 
transparency and discussion about all issues and citizens’ concerns at the centre of trade policy … 
we are engaging with civil society groups, campaigners and the wider public more than ever.’ (22 
June 2015, 5). In July, she added that ‘I hope that all these people [national parliaments, NGOs, civil 
society and other stakeholders] see the changes that we have made to take account of their views.’ (7 
July 2015, 2). The changes she was referring to included opening the negotiations to ‘unprecedented 
public scrutiny’ (7 July 2015, 2), which ‘made clear where we stand on public services [and] on 
regulation’ (7 July 2015, 2-3); the EU also ‘made proposals for a deep reform of investment 
protection.’ (7 July 2015, 3). In October, Malmström stressed the efforts of the Commission to 
continuously communicate with civil society, asking rhetorically ‘Did you know that during each 
round our negotiators stop for a day to hear presentations and then take questions from hundreds of 
civil society organizations?’ (16 October 2016, 3). She went on to emphasise how transparency is a 
principle of Trade for All, stating,  
 
The EU needs to make sure that people trust in what we are doing on their behalf. The best way to do that is 
to let them see for themselves. So, we are going to approach all our agreements as we do TTIP –releasing many 
more documents and engaging more closely with the European Parliament and national parliaments. (19 
October 2015, 6). 
 
 
Interpreting the results  
 
Our qualitative content analysis reveals (as summarised in table 2) consistency in the 
arguments of both Commissioners, with Malmström’s messaging largely building on that of her 
predecessor (as one might expect). Though Malmström’s tenure covered a longer period of TTIP 
negotiations, both were conciliatory regarding ISDS and transparency, but intransigent (through 
both positive and negative messaging) regarding the economic and geostrategic benefits of TTIP 
and its impact on EU standards. Nevertheless, the analysis also reveals a change: under Malmström 
the rhetoric became more functional than under Karel De Gucht. In other words, while the 
substance of the messages was consistent during the whole period (although they became more 
elaborate), the style of delivery changed.10    
 
                                                          
10 While the personalities of the Commissioners (De Gucht was widely seen as brash, Malmström as more conciliatory) 
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Following Brink (2009), these results indicate that the Commission learned to present its arguments 
using opponents’ language and standpoints. As discussed, Malmström claimed that TTIP was a 
means of preserving EU values and democracy. Through TTIP, the EU would be able to export its 
values and norms and establish a better equilibrium between the rights of foreign investors and 
democracy. While the DG Trade continued to consider TTIP a good option, due to its economic 
and geopolitical benefits, the message became that those benefits served European values and 
democracy. At the same time, our analysis shows that, in Hirschman’s terms, the Commission’s 
discourse became more intransigent over time. Under Malmström the Commission added negative 
messaging to defend the deal’s economic and geostrategic benefits, and positive messaging to 
counter opponents’ claims regarding both lower standards and ISDS. While opening the ISDS 
system to public discussion and consultation, and then reforming the policy, the Commission 
remained adamant on its inclusion in the agreement through its new format, the ICS, where 
governments’ rights to regulate in the public interest would be greatly enhanced and strict limits 
placed on investors’ rights to sue governments over public policy. However, the Commission altered 
the process of engaging the public and promoting trade (more transparency, dialogue, and structured 
meetings). In short, the response to TTIP contestation from 2013 to 2016 was more functional 
(process oriented) than conciliatory (giving in on policy).  
The question of whether functional theses are more important than conciliatory ones in 
terms of their impact on EU trade policy remains unclear. However, in conciliatory cases the 
Commission professes to make or have made concessions to opponents. Since, in the case of TTIP, 
these concessions largely refer to ISDS and transparency, we affirm that this rhetoric reflects an 
impact on EU trade policy. The Commission changed the process of EU trade policy promotion 
(more transparency, dialogue, and structured meetings) and proposed a new investor-state dispute 
settlement system to serve as a template for all its free trade agreements.  
In principle, one would not expect functional rhetoric to lead to any changes in EU trade 
policy. Using the language and standpoints of opponents does not equal a concession. Instead, 
conciliatory (or democracy friendly) rhetoric may be used in maintaining key arguments. Yet, as this 
analysis has shown, a functional rhetorical strategy may have unintended consequences.11 The 
rhetorical theses of the Commission towards European values and democracy were inserted in Trade 
for All, thereby becoming an integral part of the Commission’s trade strategy. By so doing, the 
Commission put EU values on the same level as economic interests. Whether such rhetorical 
commitment forces the Commission to be more open to other, future CSO demands emanating 
from concerns with other negotiations remains unclear. While the Commission’s 2017 report on 
trade and globalisation reiterated the importance of European values, proposing to increase 
transparency and the inclusiveness of trade policy-making (Commission 2017), CSOs admit being 
worried about trade’s salience in the public eye post-TTIP, or even a long-term pause, and no 
activism or public outcry surrounded the EU-Vietnam or EU-Japan negotiations (Eliasson and 
                                                          
11
 Schimmelfenning (2001) and Grube (2016) point out that changes in rhetoric may have lasting effects (‘rhetorical 
entrapment’ and ‘rhetorical path dependency’ respectively).  
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Garcia-Duran, 2018).12 Does that mean that in the future opponents will not exploit the rhetorical 
commitment of the Commission? These questions will only be assessable at a later stage and are part 
of the larger debate on whether TTIP represents an anomaly in public engagement on trade and 
TTIP’s lasting consequences (Gheyle and De Ville 2017; De Bièvre and Poletti 2017). In any case, 
the answers to such research will clarify the extent to which adopting the language and standpoints 
of opponents, and bringing EU values to the forefront of the EU’s trade policy strategy, set trade 
policy on a path to more change. 
This article demonstrates that looking at supporters’ responses to contested trade 
negotiations where opponents have been able to mobilise public opinion sheds light on the impact 
of such politicisation. Assessing the evolution of the Commission’s rhetoric in the TTIP case shows 
how the Commission changed the way it addressed the opposition (more accommodating), altered 
the process of engagement with the public and the promotion of trade (more transparency, dialogue, 
and structured meetings), and illustrates how the opposition affected trade policy (reflected in 
process changes and changes to ISDS). Since this article shows that changes in the Commission’s 
rhetorical strategy and EU trade policy occurred, we believe it warrants further research on how the 
changes affected public opinion. Public opinion on TTIP stabilised in late 2016, just as negotiations 
froze. There was a slight uptick in support for TTIP in a few countries (for example Sweden, the 
Czech Republic and the United Kingdom). Specifically, support rose among respondents who said 
they had learned about TTIP, opposition plateaued in countries where CSOs initially made inroads, 
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